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THE FUTURE 
POTENTIAL OF 
JAPANESE 
PRODUCTIVITY 
Patricia Haley 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the literature concerning Japan's 
economic development has grown significantly, with 
numerous articles being written not only by American scholars, but by Japanese 
and other foreign scholars as well. Such an interest in the Land of the Rising Sun 
is hardly surprising. Since World War II, Japan has risen from a predominantly 
low-income, agrarian society to a modern, high-income industrial economy, 
strongly and successfully competing with the advanced nations of the world (Kelley 
& Williamson, 1974). The preponderance of books and articles have dealt with 
the sources of Japanese economic growth and the "lessons" to be learned by the 
advanced nations from the Japanese experience. However, few authors have ad-
dressed Japan's potential for future economic growth. 
It is the purpose of this paper to discuss this very question of Japan's future 
growth potential. We will argue that because of changing demographic conditions, 
Japan will in all likelihood not be able to maintain the rate of economic progress 
which she has enjoyed to date. Rather, as has been the prior experience of to-
day's advanced nations, Japan will soon encounter new and perplexing social prob-
lems. These problems will ultimately retard her rate of economic growth. 
II. JAPAN'S DEVELOPMENT 
A. Growth Factors 
In looking at Japan's future, one must glance back at her past. How did Japan 
get to where she is today? What were the major sources of her growth? In one 
recent study, Denison and Chung (1976) argued that from 1953 to 1971 the major 
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source of Japan's economic development was her growth in capital. They estimated 
that increases in capital stock accounted for 2.1 percentage points of Japan's 
average annual growth rate of 8.8 percent during this eighteen-year period. The 
main components of the capital stock, nonresidential structures (including equip-
ment) and inventory, grew at an annual rate of 9.2 percent and 11.9 percent, re-
spectively, over the period. These rates might be compared to the 3.5 percent 
average annual growth rate in ~ach of these components in the U.S. over a similar 
period (1948-69). 
According to Denison and Chung, such a rapid growth of fixed capital stock 
and inventories could have been achieved only with enormous levels of annual 
investment. Such investment levels, in turn, were made possible by a combina-
tion of three factors. The first factor was the large relative decline in the prices 
of capital goods. From 1960 to 1971, the average price of all output (GNP) grew 
at a 43 percent faster rate than did average prices of all fixed nonresidential 
business investment goods. One can argue convincingly that such a sharp d~cline 
in relative prices of investment goods had a favorable effect on the level of 
investment. 
A second factor contributing to the high level of Japanese investment over 
this period was the rapid increase in national income. From 1952 to 1971, Japan's 
national income grew at a rate of 9.2 percent per year (Denison & Chung, 1976). 
Along with the fact that most of this gain in income was accompanied by rising 
land and equity values, Japanese development was highly favorable toward private 
business. As business leaders were driven to match their own enterprise expan-
sion with those of their rivals, a correspondingly large proportion of the growing 
corporate wealth was poured into industrial growth. Furthermore, because Jap-
anese government policy was directed toward developing an industrial sector 
similar to those of the advanced nations, generous support was given to innovative 
industries dedicated to expansion. 
The third factor which contributed greatly to Japan's superior investment per-
formance over the period was the great increase in the proportion of national in-
come directed to savings. Japan's savings rate (savings as a percentage of GNP) 
nearly doubled over the period from 1952 to 1971. From 1961 to 1971, Japan saved 
28.8 percent of GNP compared to the U.S. rate of 15.8 percent for the same period 
(Bieda, 1970). Significantly, noncorporate savings accounted for more than half 
the Japanese total, a reflection of the Japanese tradition of thriftiness. The high 
savings rate can also be attributed to an inadequate social security system. Because 
social security benefits are low in Japan, individual families are usually left with 
the major responsibility for making provisions for themselves in case of unemploy-
ment, illness, or old age. Another factor influencing the high Japanese savings 
rate is the high priority which has been given to education in the postwar period. 
With education seen as the key to entering most careers, Japanese families are 
usually willing to pay high tuition fees to ensure their children a quality educa-
tion. This, of course, has encouraged families to save a sizable portion of their 
incomes to finance the costs of their children's education. 
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We have stressed the fact that a large portion of Japan's savings consists of 
personal savings rather than corporate savings. This being the case, we will now 
analyze the present and future Japanese labor force-the primary source of per-
sonal savings in the Japanese economy. 
B. The Changing Japanese Labor Force 
Given the present structure of any nation's population, further changes in the 
population are determined solely by births, deaths, and migration (Hauser, 1979). 
Migration to and from Japan has played virtually no role in Japan's changing 
population. The migration rate has averaged zero percent per year since 1950 
and is not expected to change significantly in the future. There has, however, been 
a sharp decline in the birth rate since 1950. The reasons for this decline are 
numerous, but one of the most important reasons is the freer access to informa-
tion on contraceptive techniques. Furthermore, the population policies of Japan 
are very liberal toward abortions, a fact which has made the abortion rate in Japan 
one of the highest in the world. 
The death rate in Japan, on the other hand, has shown little overall change 
since 1950. One might at first expect that the advances in medicine and hygiene 
and the improvements in Japanese nutrition over the past thirty years would have 
caused the annual mortality rate to decline. Indeed, the average life expectancy 
has increased from 58 to 73 years for males and from 62 to 79 years for females 
over the postwar period (Ogawa, 1982). In general, however, a rise in the life ex-
pectancy of the population tends to result in only a temporary decline in the death 
rate. Eventually, the increase in the number of older people causes the death rate 
to reverse its decline. For the case of Japan, the sharp decline in the birth rate 
accompanied by an initial (at least) decline in the death rate has meant that the 
proportion of older people in the Japanese population is currently rising. Accord-
ing to present estimates, the percentage of the total Japanese population which 
is 65 years or over will increase from just under eight percent in 1975 to almost 
19 percent in the year 2020 (Ogawa, 1982). This aging of the general Japanese 
population will result, of course, in a similar aging of the Japanese labor force. 
For example, the percentage of workers aged 45 to 64 (as a percentage of the 
total working age population) is expected to increase from 29 percent in 1975 to 
about 38 percent in 2020 (Ogawa, 1982). 
III. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AN AGING SOCIETY 
The economic consequences of the aging of the Japanese population will be both 
numerous and far-reaching. First, a large portion of productive Japanese man-
power will have to be redirected to the service industries to accommodate the 
increased demand for health, medical and welfare services for the elderly (Hauser, 
1979). Such industries are by their nature labor-intensive and do not easily lend 
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themselves to capital substitution of a labor-saving type (Kurihara, 1971). With 
the birth-rate decline already having caused a marked reduction in the supply of 
certain types of labor (particularly new recruits and management trainees), the 
increased demand for labor in these industries is likely to further aggravate the 
general problem of labor scarcity in Japan. The growing labor requirements in 
these service industries will thus increase competition in an already tight labor 
market and will affect not only the services sector, but the manufacturing sector 
as well. Inasmuch as productivity growth in the service industries is generally 
lower than that in manufacturing, the relative growth of the service sector would 
also mean a lower rate of growth in labor productivity in the Japanese economy. 
A second major consequence of the aging of the Japanese population concerns 
the wage system in Japan. Unlike the situation in the United States, where pay 
is usually based upon skill, past experience, and the degree of responsibility, many 
Japanese companies follow a seniority wage system (nenko) in which pay is a func-
tion mainly of age and education. Japanese employees are given an initial base 
wage, to which is added a work allowance (usually a certain percentage of the 
base pay), an age allowance, and an attendance allowance (Ogawa, 1982). Since 
the base wage comprises only about 25 percent of the total pay, there is little rela-
tionship between work performance and compensation. Rather, it is implicitly 
assumed that each employee is working at his capacity (Galenson & Konosuke, 
1976). All employees therefore receive compensation largely according to the 
length of service with the organization, regardless of individual performance. A 
major consequence of such a system of compensation is that as the average age 
of the Japanese firm's labor force increases, the firm will find itself faced with 
increasing labor costs. 
It should also be pointed out that the aging of any labor force generally car-
ries with it a reduction in its adaptability to new techniques and working methods, 
causing the average quality of the labor factor to decline as it ages (Ogawa, 1982). 
Therefore, as the proportion of older workers in the Japanese labor force increases, 
those companies operating under the nenko system will find themselves faced with 
an increasing wage bill coupled with a deterioration in labor quality. The conse-
quence is that future labor costs in Japan will probably rise at a faster rate than 
in the past. 
Within the manufacturing sector, the relative decline in the youngest segment 
of the Japanese labor force in the upcoming years may also greatly limit expan-
sion in new and innovative areas. Indeed, this may be aggravated by one of the 
unique features of the Japanese industrial relations system-the practice of 
"lifetime employment." Exercised by virtually all major enterprises, the lifetime 
employment concept involves a permanent job guarantee made to all employees 
who attain regular status with a firm. During this time, an employee can expect 
to receive proper training in his field and advancement in rank and wage. As a 
result, the typical employee usually acquires a strong loyalty to the firm, and it 
is rare for such an employee to voluntarily leave the firm. With employee turn-
over practically nonexistent, virtually all new employees hired by the firm are 
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recruited from schools and universities. As the changing demographic forces 
discussed above result in a decline in the student-age population and the number 
of young graduates, a shortage of technical minds for industrializing firms will 
occur. This shortage may affect not only the efficient operation of already ex-
isting industrial equipment, but also the volume of new technological developments. 
Because Japan's growth is so highly dependent upon new and creative tech-
nologies, her competitive position could be seriously weakened by the scarcity of 
educated youth manpower. 
Taken as a whole, the above-mentioned consequences of Japan's aging popula-
tion make a lower rate of economic growth in that country a very distinct possibil-
ity. But, perhaps the most serious effect of the demographic changes is the rise 
in the proportion of the population which will be dependent upon the working 
population. This increase in the "dependency ratio" will result primarily from the 
aging of the Japanese population, since the proportion of youthful dependents 
is falling with the birth rate. In analyzing the consequences of an increasing 
dependency ratio, it is important to distinguish between the older and younger 
segments of the dependent population. While outlays on the part of the work force 
are necessary for the support of both groups of dependents, outlays for the younger 
dependent may properly be regarded as an investment in human capital, an asset 
whose earning potential will be tapped once the child enters the labor force. On 
the other hand, although the outlays for the older dependent may still provide 
positive psychological and emotional returns ("psychic income," in the language 
of economists), such outlays yield no economic return since the nonworking older 
dependent will no longer be a contributing member of the workforce. 
To some extent, the nonworking older population can live on their savings 
or rely upon Japan's social security system. As we have previously mentioned, 
however, the latter program is largely inadequate. By international comparisons, 
expenditures for social security in Japan are very low, with the average monthly 
pension in 1972 only about 22.5% of average wage income at that time (Galenson 
& Konosuke, 1976). Furthermore, company benefits to the retired worker nor-
mally consist of a single lump-sum payment. This payment, although not uniform, 
usually ranges from only two to four years' salary, depending on the size of the 
firm and the length of service of the employee. Such an amount is often not suffi-
cient to support an individual for the remainder of his life. Not only is the real 
value of the payment subject to inflation, but the average life expectancy for in-
dividuals upon retirement is considerably greater than two to) four years. Un-
doubtedly, the working population of Japan will bear an increasingly heavy burden 
in the future because of the rising dependency ratio and the inadequate social 
security system. 
It is important to note that the Japanese social insurance system covers vir-
tually all residents of the country, whether or not they have been gainfully 
employed (OECD, 1973). The system actually consists of two funds, the Employees 
Pension Program (EPP) and the National Pension Program (NPP). The EPP is 
financed jointly by employee contributions (currently 4.55% of total yearly earn-
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ings) matched by equal contributions by employers. The government also provides 
a subsidy of 20o/o of benefit costs. The NPP is funded through payments of ap-
proximately 3300 yen per month by all adult citizens who are not covered by any 
other pension program, with the government contributing an additional one-third 
of the benefits paid during the year. Thus, as the dependency ratio of the Japanese 
population rises, both the government and employers will be subject to increas-
ing financial burdens from these social insurance programs. The proportion of 
national income allocated to these programs will rise sharply and may comprise 
as much as 40o/o of national income according to some estimates (Seki, 1980). This 
being the case, savings rates will be further affected, along with Japan's ability 
to finance future investment. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Demographic conditions in a particular nation cannot be excluded when estimating 
that nation's potential economic performance. The age structure of Japan's popula-
tion proved to be extremely advantageous to her growth process during the 
postwar period. But, there is no such thing as a free lunch, and in future years, 
Japan will have to pay the price. Although her GNP growth rate will not drop 
to zero, it will probably be slowed to a considerable degree because of the aging 
of her population. 
The United States, incidentally, is not immune from the problems of an aging 
population either. In fact, declining birth rates and falling mortality rates are con-
ditions prevailing in most countries of the world today. But while the present pro-
portion of persons over 55 years of age in Japan is not as high as in North American 
and Northern European countries, by the year 2025 Japan will shoulder the highest 
proportion of older people (29 percent) among these countries. Thus, the particu-
larly pressing problem for Japan is that the change in the age structure of her 
population will be a most abrupt one. 
This is not to paint a gloomy scenario for the country, for steps are already 
being taken to protect aginst the upcoming ''storm.'' Such steps include possibly 
raising the retirement age and refining the social insurance systems. The im-
plementation of such reforms will have to be prompt, however, for it may be too 
late to buy a new umbrella when the rain has already begun. 
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